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The Normativity of Mind-World Relations: Comments on Sosa 
Allan Hazlett 
allanhazlett@gmail.com 
Abstract: In these comments I discuss the account of action, perception, and knowledge 
presented in “Mind-World Relations,” with a focus on the implications of this account 
for the would-be normativity of action, perception, and knowledge.     
In “Mind-World Relations,” Ernie Sosa proposes a performance-theoretic account of 
three mind-world relations: action, perception, and knowledge.  All three are species of 
success that is caused, in the right way, by competence – but what is it for success to be 
caused “in the right way” by competence?  Sosa’s answer is that success is caused “in the 
right way” by competence when success manifests competence.  In each case we are able 
to distinguish the good case – e.g. in which you intentionally startles your boss, perceive 
the sun, or know that the cat is on the mat – from the bad case – e.g. in which you drop 
your tray and unintentionally startle your boss, enjoy a visual experience caused by a 
torch without perceiving, or have a justified true belief that the man who will get the job 
has ten coins in his pocket without knowing that the man who will get the job has ten 
coins in his pocket – by appeal to the fact that in the good case, but not in the bad case, 
competence is manifested. 
Can we go further?  Can we answer the question of what it is for competence to be 
manifested?  A competence is a disposition to succeed, just as fragility is a disposition to 
break.  But just as not all breakings because of fragility are manifestations of fragility, not 
all successes because of competence are manifestations of competence.  Consider a 
normal case of fragility manifested: a fragile glass shatters upon impact with the floor.  
But compare an abnormal case of fragility not manifested: a fragile glass shatters upon 
impact with the floor because of the intervention of a fragility-hating zapper, who causes 
the glass to shatter just as it hits the floor.  What distinguishes cases of manifestation 
from cases of non-manifestation?  Sosa’s answer is: unarticulated (and perhaps ineffable) 
community convention.  Just as communities agree to conventions that draw a boundary 
between polite behavior and impolite behavior, by positing standards of etiquette, they 
agree to conventions that draw a boundary between cases of manifestation and cases of 
non-manifestation, by positing standards of normality.  Fragility is manifested when a 
glass disposed to shatter in normal conditions shatters in those conditions because it is 
so disposed; fragility is not manifested when a glass disposed to shatter in normal 
conditions shatters in abnormal conditions.  And knowledge of what is normal and what 
is abnormal is just “part of the instrumentally determined commonsense that humans 
live by.”1   
The idea that knowledge is, in some sense, normative is a persistent theme in 
contemporary epistemology.  When we broaden our inquiry to include mind-world 
relations in general, we are reminded of the ideas of the normativity of content, of the 
normativity of psychology, of the normativity of propositional attitude attributions, of 
the normativity of the mental, and of related themes.  Here I should like to ask: does 
Sosa’s account imply that action, perception, and knowledge are, in some sense, 
normative? 
                                                
1 All quotations from Sosa are from “Mind-World Relations,” this volume.   
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Two ideas concerning knowledge can be bracketed.  First, you might think that 
knowledge is normative because it is a norm: for example, you might think that a doctor 
ought not prescribe medicine unless she knows that it is safe.  This provides a sense in 
which knowledge is normative – we might say that knowledge is “normative for 
prescribing medicine.”  But Sosa’s account is orthogonal to whether knowledge is a norm.  
Second, we can set aside any normativity arising exclusively from the factivity of 
knowledge.  If you were wondering whether to believe that p, or to stop inquiring about 
whether p, or to treat the proposition that p as a reason for action, you would be 
enlightened to find out that someone knows that p, because this entails that p.  But this 
seems true of factive states in general.  Sosa’s account straightforwardly implies the 
factivity of knowledge.  But we can set this point aside.     
In her influential discussion of normativity, Christine Korsgaard writes that certain 
concepts, including the concept of knowledge, “have a normative dimension” because 
“they tell us what to think, what to like, what to say, what to do, and what to be.”2  
Following Sosa’s focus on metaphysical, rather than semantic or conceptual, analysis, we 
can say that some non-linguistic and non-conceptual thing is normative just in case it 
tells us what to think, what to like, what to say, what to do, or what to be.  What could 
this mean?  Consider suffering.  Many would argue that suffering per se is bad, where 
this entails that that we always have pro tanto reason to prevent suffering, or that we 
always ought to prevent suffering, other things being equal, or that we always ought to 
dislike suffering.  This is just a rough sketch of the kinds of things that badness entails, 
but the idea that suffering per se is bad would provide a sense in which suffering is 
normative.  Now consider knowledge.  Many would argue that knowledge per se is good, 
where this entails that we always have pro tanto reason to produce knowledge, or that we 
always ought to produce knowledge, other things being equal, or that we always ought to 
like knowledge.  Again, this is just a rough sketch of the kinds of things that goodness 
entails, but the idea that knowledge per se is good would provide a sense in which 
knowledge is normative.  As well, the idea that action per se is good would provide a 
sense in which action is normative, and the idea that perception per se is good would 
provide a sense in which perception is normative. 
However, given Sosa’s account, neither action, nor perception, nor knowledge is 
plausibly understood as per se good.  Action, on Sosa’s view, is “apt intention” – 
someone acts when her Φing manifests her competence to Φ.  But action, so understood, 
is not per se good – the goodness of actions seems to depend on the content of their 
constitutive intentions.  There is nothing good about my apt intention to own a saucer of 
mud, i.e. my acquisition of a saucer of mud, unless there is something good about my 
owning a saucer of mud.  Actions aren’t good just in virtue of being actions.  And the 
goodness of perception is likewise conditional.  Perception, on Sosa’s view, is “apt 
perceptual experience,” where this “involves functional, teleological aimings, through the 
teleology of our perceptual systems.”  Our perceptual systems achieve their aim when 
they function properly.  (In this case proper functioning is a matter of natural history: for 
our perceptual systems to function properly is for our perceptual systems to do that 
which they evolved to do.)  But proper functioning isn’t per se good: nutritious meals are 
sometimes nasty; reproductive sex is sometimes no fun.  So perceptions aren’t good just 
in virtue of being perceptions. 
                                                
2 The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 9.   
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What about knowledge?  Here Sosa offers a disjunctive account.  One sort of knowledge 
is “teleological” and “perception-like” and is the fulfillment of a teleological aim – but 
this sort of knowledge isn’t plausibly understood as per se good, for the same reason that 
perception isn’t plausibly understood as per se good.   The other sort of knowledge is 
“judgmental” and “action-like” and is the fulfillment of an intention – but this sort of 
knowledge isn’t plausibly understood as per se good, for the same reason that action isn’t 
plausibly understood as per se good.3   
I think it is important that this conclusion – that action, perception, and knowledge 
aren’t plausibly understood as per se good – is consistent with the idea that we have 
good reason to employ the concepts of action, perception, and knowledge.  The 
boundary between cases of competence manifested (as in the good cases cases of action, 
perception, and knowledge) and cases of mere causation by competence (as in the 
corresponding bad cases) is down to convention, but Sosa suggests that we have good 
reason to draw this boundary where we do.  The difference between competence 
manifested and mere causation by competence makes a difference when it comes to 
credit and discredit, praise and blame, approval and disapproval, trust and distrust, and 
this “has a large bearing on human flourishing, individually and collectively.”  But a 
valuable distinction is not necessarily, or even typically, a distinction in value.  We do well 
to distinguish hawks from handsaws, but neither hawks nor handsaws are therefore 
valuable, nor are hawks therefore better than handsaws (or handsaws therefore better 
than hawks).  The utility of the distinction between competence manifested and mere 
causation by competence thus tells us nothing about the value of action, perception, and 
knowledge.  Importantly, it does not tell us that knowledge is better than mere true belief, 
just as the utility of the distinction between shatterings that manifest fragility and 
shatterings that are merely caused by fragility does not tell us that the former are better 
than the latter.4 
Given Sosa’s account, neither action, nor perception, nor knowledge is plausibly 
understood as per se good.  Arguing that action, perception, and knowledge are per se 
good would have been a way to vindicate the idea that action, perception, and knowledge 
are normative.  But Sosa’s account does not jibe with such an argument.   
We have focused on the normativity of three non-linguistic and non-conceptual mind-
world relations: action, perception, and knowledge.  What about the normativity of 
concepts (e.g. the concepts of action, perception, and knowledge) and the normativity of 
bits of thought and language (e.g. attributions of action, perception, and knowledge)?  
Consider knowledge attributions.  Sosa compares the boundary between knowledge and 
non-knowledge to the boundary between polite and impolite behavior.  To attribute 
politeness to some particular behavior is often (or perhaps always) to express 
endorsement, approval, praise, or some other such “pro-attitude” towards said behavior; 
this provides a sense in which politeness attributions are normative.  Perhaps the same is 
                                                
3 What if true belief per se is good?  Since knowledge is the attainment of true belief (that 
manifests competence), knowledge might inherit or enhance the prior per se goodness of 
true belief.  For a critique of the per se goodness of true belief, see my A Luxury of the 
Understanding: On the Value of True Belief (Oxford University Press, 2013).   
4 Nor would it help were we to appeal to the utility of valuing knowledge per se, for this 
would be the wrong kind of reason to think that knowledge per se is good.  Compare 
Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton University Press, 
2002).   
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true of knowledge attributions – perhaps they are normative in the same sense.5  But this 
is neither entailed nor explained by Sosa’s metaphysical account.  Attributions of 
knowledge, for Sosa, are attributions of a particular kind of manifestation; attributions of 
manifestation, in general, are not normative (in the present sense).  And it does not seem 
that action attributions, for example, are normative (in the present sense): just to call 
something an action is not to endorse or praise it.  The unity of action, perception, and 
knowledge does not suggest the normativity (in the present sense) of knowledge 
attributions.    
Recall the persistence of the theme of the normativity of knowledge in contemporary 
epistemology.  Imagine that a particular metaphysical analysis of knowledge entails that 
knowledge is not normative.  (I have not argued that Sosa’s account is an account of this 
kind, but I do suspect that it is.)  The idea that knowledge is normative is a kind of 
truism in contemporary epistemology.  You might think that any metaphysical analysis of 
knowledge is flawed if it fails to reveal a nature that entails and explains the normativity 
of knowledge – and so our imagined analysis is therefore flawed.   
Truisms come and go.  We should consider their rise and fall carefully through both 
idealist and materialist historical analysis.  Questions of value were infrequently discussed 
in 20th century Anglophone epistemology.  In this connection, two events warrant 
mention.  First, consider the marginalization of ethics and aesthetics in the middle part of 
the century, arising, on the one hand, from the positivistic rejection of normative 
language as meaningless and, on the other, from the dangers of appearing political in a 
nervous Cold War climate.  All this predicts for the survival of a distinctly non-normative 
discipline of epistemology.  Second, consider the rapid growth of universities throughout 
the century, with the subsequent economic need for increased academic specialization, 
and the subsequent division of philosophers into “epistemologists,” “ethicists,” 
“metaphysicians,” etc.  All this predicts for the need to develop the idea of “the 
epistemic” as a category distinct from the ethical and the aesthetic. 
It may be useful here to ask why we may find ourselves unsatisfied with an analysis of 
action, perception, and knowledge that appeals to causation “in the right way,” and gives 
no further account of this.  Why, in other words, do we think it a virtue to be able to give 
an account of causation “in the right way”?  One reason, surely, is that we fear the appeal 
to “the right way” may mean we have given no account at all of action, perception, and 
knowledge.  When we say that action, perception, and knowledge are caused “in the right 
way,” we may just mean that they are caused in the ways that respectively cause action, 
perception, and knowledge.  However, another reason may be that we detect the specter 
of unexplained normativity in the phrase “in the right way” – spectral, in virtue of our 
commitment to a philosophical naturalism which seeks to explain normativity in non-
normative terms.  From this perspective, you might think that it is an asset for any 
metaphysical analysis of knowledge that it is silent on the normativity of knowledge.   
Reliabilism in the theory of knowledge was first motivated, for some, by the kind of 
naturalism just described.6  Reliabilists aimed to analyize knowledge without appeal to 
                                                
5 Cf. my “Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse,” in A. 
Fairweather and O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 223-46.   
6 See Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?,” in G. Pappas (ed.), Justification and 
Knowledge: New Essays in Epistemology (D. Reidel Publishing, 1979), pp. 1-23.  It’s not an 
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such terms as “justification,” “evidence,” and “the right to be sure.”  Success would 
mean an analysis of knowledge in non-epistemic and non-normative terms, perhaps even 
in scientific terms.  We might see Sosa’s present account as an attempt to bridge the gap 
between the early reliabilist analyses – on which knowledge is obviously not normative – 
and the contemporary truism that knowledge is normative.  It seems to m that this gap 
has yet to be bridged.   
There is a sense of “normative” that we have not discussed.  Consider Arnon Goldfinger.  
We might say that gold is normative for Goldfinger – it is what he cares about, and thus 
what animates and guides him in deciding what to do and how to live.  This is all just 
another way of saying that Goldfinger loves gold.  Now, given this sense of “normative,” 
we could say that knowledge is normative for us.  The plausibility of this claim will 
depend, of course, on who we mean by “us.”  With the scope of “us” suitably restricted 
– whether to epistemologists, philosophers, the curious, or the intellectually virtuous – it 
is plausible that knowledge is normative for us.  Knowledge is what we care about, and 
thus what animates and guides us in deciding what to do and how to live.  And this is 
just to say that we love knowledge.  However, to say that something is normative for 
someone is just to describe how she regulates her conduct; it is not to prescribe anything 
to her.  So the present sense of “normative” is fundamentally different from Korsgaard’s 
sense (above).  But, on the present sense of “normative,” it is perfectly compatible with 
Sosa’s account that knowledge is normative for us – where this is just to say that we love 
knowledge.  And we might say the same of action, perception, and other mind-world 
relations.   
-- 
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accident that Goldman’s approach, modeled on a utilitarian theory of right, also 
implicates the epistemological analogue of meta-ethical “naturalism.” 
